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SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
James P. Piscatori*
The Middle East, broadly defined, is
penetrated by five bodies of water, the
five "fingers" of the Mediterranean,
Black, Caspian, and Red Seas, and the
Persian Gulf. The Red Sea and Gulf
have received particular attention in
recent history. The significance of the
Red Sea stems, first of all, \ from its
connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israel has one non-Mediterranean port,
Eilat, which can only be reached
through the Red Sea and then through
the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Denial of entry to
Israel through closure of the Straits of
Tiran was considered a casus belli in
1967, and in 1973 a blockade of the
entire sea was carried out at the Bab
al-Mandab Strait to support the war
aims of the Arab front. Some strategists
believe that in a long war similar action
could offset the Israeli advantage in
holding Sharm al-Shaykh.l Second, the

Red Sea is important as the gateway to
the Suez Canal, which itself was economically and strategically significant
prior to 1967, because it reduces by
one-half the Gulf to London journey.
The recently reopened canal probably
will be highly significant again as it is
widened and deepened to accommodate
ships of the 150,OOO-ton range and
eventually of the 270,OOO-ton range?
Finally, the Soviet base at Berbera in
Somalia highlights the vulnerability of
access to the sea itself.
Of far greater importance is the
Persian Gulf. Indeed, the growing industrial dependence on oil, even more than
the discovery and exploitation of the
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resource itself, has helped to move the
Gulf to the economic, strategic, and
political forefront of world politics. The
oil imported by the United States from
the Middle East as a whole, for example,
constituted 15-17 percent of total
American oil imports during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. American imports
from the region then were 877,000
barrels per day and during the first 6
months of 1976 the figures rose to
2,124,000 barrels per day.3 Though the
increase is substantial, American oil
imports from the Middle East do not
yet rival the present 80 percent level of
oil imports for Western Europe. This
Middle Eastern connection is not surprising since the area as a whole contributes about half the total oil production in the world, with Persian Gulf
countries in particular producing onethird of the total. 4
Given the sudden changes in the
price of oil fixed by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
the revenues that are accruing to these
states have no less suddenly increased.
Iran is spending about $69 billion and
Saudi Arabia approximately $140 billion in their current Five Year Plans to
develop infrastructures and to provide
new social services. Iraq is budgeting
over $3 billion per year for investment
and development purposes. These
ambitious plans have stimulated a flurry
of activity by European and American
businesses competing to provide the
technical services and sophisticated
equipment required. The wealth in the
Gulf is also being used to build up
national armories. In 1974 alone, Persian Gulf countries purchased over $4
billion worth of arms from the United
States, $1 billion from France, $500
million from Great Britain, and $340
million from the Soviet Union.5 The
trend is accelerating, 6 and it is already
clear that military sales in the Gulf, like
commercial sales and services there,
constitute big business. Gulf countries,
in short, are amassing great fortunes

which also are converted into profits for
the oil-consuming and technologically
advanced countries.
This economic interdependence has
added to the strategic importance attached to the Persian Gulf area since the
British withdrew in 1971. The Soviet
presence in the upper Gulf, symbolized
by the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation and
Friendship with Iraq, 7 has been of
concern to Western strategists. There is
some evidence that Soviet influence was
waning in Iraq,8 but recently there has
been a strengthening of ties. 9 In light of
the lingering Soviet presence, regional
cooperation to exclude all external
powers is the American goal in the Gulf.
Several factors overlap to account for
the position of the United States: fear
not only of a forcible interruption of
the oil flow through the Strait of
Hormuz but also of Soviet-inspired revolution against the traditional, proWestern, regimes; knowledge that the
American presence itself is limited to
one command ship and two surface
combatants, forming the Middle East
Force at Bahrain;1o and sensitivity to
the potential spillover effect naval competition in the Indian Ocean could have
because of its geographical proximity.
In light of this reliance on friendly,
regional policemen-mainly Iran 11 but
also Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent,
American arms sales to the Gulf are seen
as valuable in more than the economic
sense.
It is against this background of intersecting interests-economic, political,
and strategic-that law of the sea issues
in the Persian Gulf and the positions of
Gulf States on those issues assume
importance. Maritime disputes affect
regional stability, and, moreover, several
of the littoral states wield such economic and potential military might that
their views may influence the direction
of the developing law. Saudi Arabia, at
first glance, would seem unlikely to
have any impact on the law of the sea.
The predominantly desert character of
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its landmass, the world's 13th largest,
has given greater historical significance
to the nomadic Badu than to dhowequipped sailors. And the Saudi Navy is
small, though growing: 1,500 personnel,
about 2,000 officers and men in training
at the San Diego Naval Training Center,
two naval bases, three fast patrol boats
(FPB), one patrol boat, and several
landing craft and mine counter measures
(MCM) on order. 1 2
There are, however, three reasons
why the Saudi position deserves attention. First, Saudi Arabia's stature in
world politics has dramatically increased. With one-quarter of the world's
producible oil reserves, the Kingdom
possesses twice the reserves of the Western Hemisphere and twice those of the
Soviet Union. 1 3 In addition, Saudi
Arabia, providing 25 percent of American oil imports today as compared to 10
percent before the 1973 war, represents
the principal Middle Eastern supplier of
oil to the United States. The wealth of
natural resources has been translated
into political influence as the West
generally and the United States particularly have realized that their economic
well-being is in large measure due to the
goodwill of the Saudis. This wealth has
also allowed Saudi Arabia to exert
considerable impact on Arab states,
especially on Egypt which seems incessantly in search of a financial backer.
That the Saudis themselves are aware
that their political role has expanded is
seen by the recent rapprochement with
Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, both of which have
long been hostile to the "conservative"
Saudi monarchy. International law and
politics are intertwined, and if for no
other reason, Saudi Arabia's position on
the law of the sea should be examined
because the Kingdom itself is potentially on the level of world politics a
major power, and actually within the
Middle Eastern subsystem, a great
power.
Secondly, the Persian Gulf has been

the scene of disputes over the delimitation of offshore boundaries, several of
which have involved Saudi Arabia. Disagreements persist between Iran and
Iraq, and Iran and the United Arab'
Emirates. Additionally, there are
boundary and territorial differences between Iraq and Kuwait, over Bubiyan
and aI-Warba islands, and between Qatar
and Bahrain, particularly over the status
of the Howar Islands. 14 Saudi Arabia
represents a Gulf state that has directly
negotiated agreements with its neighbors, Bahrain and Iran, and that is
presently dealing with Qatar and Kuwait
in regard to outstanding problems.
Finally, Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its
location, is able to exert .some control
over another important maritime areathe Gulf of 'Aqaba. Although Saudi
Arabia is not a "confrontation" state in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, its legal stance
on this question of passage through
straits has contributed to the general
hostility and complicated the search for
a modus vivendi.
Law of the Sea Positions. Saudi
Arabia prides itself on its Islamic heritage and its policy is often shaped
around principles of the faith. While the
daring exploits of Arab sailors are
historically well-known, the sea, however, has been a comparatively less
important consideration to the largely
land-based Arab Muslims. The Qur'an
itself displays an ambivalence on the
subject with one passage indicating that
men should be thankful for the livelihood, food, and riches the waters yield
(XVI:14) and another suggesting that
the devil inhabits the sea (XVIII:62).
The Prophet Muhammad had little to
add save perhaps that Muslims who die
in a seaborne jihad will be doubly
rewarded in the afterlife. The rules of
naval warfare were developed through
qiyas or analogy and hardly differ from
those of land conflict. They incorporate
certain moderate principles: an enemy
ship in distress is to be issued an aman
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or safe passage into coastal waters, and
in keeping with general practice, vessels
bearing diplomatic envoys are thought
to possess a special status. 15 It is clear
that the Shan 'a or basic law does not
address itself to the controversial law of
the sea issues of the 20th century.
Lacking traditional guidance, therefore,
Saudi Arabia has generally adopted a
course not far different from that which
is outlined in the international conventions.
Breadth of Territorial Sea. From the
earliest days of the country, concern
with the waters closest to the coast has
been pragmatic in nature as evidenced
by the fact that the first references are
found in the fishing and Coast Guard
regulations. The fishing rules defined
the "coastal waters" of the then Kingdom of the Hijaz, Najd, and Dependencies as the area within 4 miles of the
coasts not including gulfs and inlets. 16
The Regulations for the Coast Guard
Directorate and its Divisions were primarily concerned with the "customs
line" that was identical with the outer
limit of Coast Guard control and that
extended to 4 miles off the shore and
10 miles within. This limit was not
equivalent to the breadth of the territorial sea because of Article 49 (b)
which allowed the sea patrol in the
performance of its duties to "go beyond
the customs line within the boundaries
of the Saudi Arab Kingdom when pursuing boats and smugglers.,,17 The
outer boundaries were unspecified, but
the assumption can be made, on the
basis of the permission to go beyond the
customs line, that territorial jurisdiction
was seen as extending beyond the 4-IrJ1e
zone mentioned in both the fishing and
Coast Guard regulations.
The Saudi government reminded its
neighbors in 1933 that no precise sea
boundaries had been agreed upon and
that no rule of international law existed
to facilitate the delimitation of territorial waters. 18 It was not until Royal

Decree 6/4/5/3711 of 2 Sha'ban 1368
(28 May 1949) that the term "territorial
waters" was employed and precisely
defined. These waters encompassed the
inland waters of bays, shoals, and those
between island and the mainland and
between islands themselves, in addition
to the "coastal sea" which extended
outside the inland waters to a distance
of 6 miles. This definition departed
from the text of the original fishing
rules in that it applied to all coasts of
the Kingdom unified under the Saudi
title in 1932-the Red Sea, Gulf of
'Aqaba, and Persian GUlf.19 In relying
on a 6-mile limit, Saudi Arabia chose to
follow the earlier examples of the Ottoman Empire, Syria, and Iran. 2o Saudi
Arabia however, led the way when it
changed the relevant terminology to
"territorial sea" and extended its
boundaries to 12 nautical miles in a
1958 royal decree. 2 1 The effect was
immediate as the two other major
powers in the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, soon
thereafter extended their limits to 12
miles.
In the explicit designation of territorial waters and seas, the two decrees,
particularly the second, went far toward
bringing Saudi Arabia into the mainstream of the international law of the
sea. In contrast to early regulations, the
1949 proclamation of King 'Abd
al-' Azlz expressly declared that Saudi
sovereignty extends to the territorial
waters, the air above, and the soil and
subsoil below. Another and significant
indicator of Saudi Arabia's growing
sophistication was the general invocation of international law and the specific reference to the principle of innocent passage as the sole limitation on its
sovereignty in the 1949 decree. The
1958 decree was more general in its
provision that Saudi sovereignty is
limited by existing rules of international
law (Article 2). Herbert Liebesny's conclusion, though specifically directed to
the 1949 decree, is also relevant to the
later proclamation: "The Saudi decree
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on territorial waters is a very carefully
drawn document which is more detailed
than many similar decrees and embodies
modern theories of international law on
the subject.,,22 The comment would be
of no interest were it not for the fact
that Saudi Arabia often is accused of a
medieval mentality.
The 1958 decree in particular was
designed to put Saudi Arabia on an
equal footing with other states at the
first Law of the Sea Conference. The
Saudi delegation chairman, Ahmad
al-Shuqayn, Minister of State for United
Nations Affairs, specifically pointed out
that Saudi Arabia's change of words to
"territorial sea" put it in line with the
draft convention and was made to avoid
the misleading impression that territorial waters are limited only to inland
waters. The delegate also took an uncompromising stand on what has become the standard Saudi commitment
to a 12-mile territorial sea. Al-Shuqaycl,
particularly critical of the United Kingdom's defense of the 3-mile limit,
argued that the political and economic
demands of the present age require a
wider belt. He denied, moreover, that
the 3-mile limit was never uniformly
accepted and pointed to a number of
Western scholars in support of his position that states have determined their
boundaries for a variety of reasons apart
from the 3·mile example.
Saudi Arabia thus suggested that
states be allowed to set their own limits
within a 12-mile maximum in order to
provide some flexibility in the parameters sanctioned by (1) security needs,
(2) new economic and technical developments, (3) state practice, and (4) a
new legal consensus. In this sense,
al-Shuqayn made the point that the
debate is political and economic as well
as juridical, yet he was not so attuned to
the politicization of the debate that he
could accept U.S. Representative Dean's
speculation that the price of transporting Saudi oil would increase as the
territorial sea widens. 2 3

There was strong Saudi opposition to
the American proposal for a 6-mile
breadth. Al-Shuqayn, invoking the International Law Commission's opinion
that the territorial sea may be legitimately extended to 12 miles, pledged
that his country would not become a
party to a convention that adopted the
American draft. Ironically for so antiCommunist a state as Saudi Arabia, its
position echoed that of the Soviet bloc.
Saudi Arabia specifically joined forces
with Burma, Colombia, Indonesia,
Mexico, Morocco, the United Arab
Republic, and Venezuela in sponsoring a
draft calling for a territorial sea of 12
miles with a contiguous fishing zone of
an extra 12 miles. None of the proposals
gained the necessary two-thirds majority,24 and Saudi Arabia did not
become a party to the 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, nor to any of the other conventions for that matter.
By the 1960 conference, the Saudi
position seems to have hardened on the
importance of the territorial sea question. The success of the regime of the
sea by then was predicated on the
resolution of this one issue. As a result,
al-Shuqayri advanced the central thesis
that the law of the sea is indivisibleeither there is a complete law with the
territorial sea settled or there is no law
at all. In almost sacrilegious rhetoric for
a Saudi, he intoned this warning: "Without an acceptable formula for the determination of the territorial sea, these
conventions of ours will remain outside
the sacred temple of international
laW."25
The Kingdom was persistent in advocating the 12-mile rule, and it is interesting to note that the manner of argument
was entirely a-Islamic. Al-Shuqayrl
based his presentation on an appeal,
inter alia, to state interests, the position
of the polyculturally legitimate International Law Commission, Moore's Digest
of International Law, the British High
Court of Justice, and nowhere was Islam
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invoked. Despite the Western-based
rationale, Saudi Arabia clearly felt, at
that time, that its identity should be
tied to the Third World, which was
believed to be rising up to reject the
colonial legacy and to assert the
equality and sovereignty of every state.
The anti-imperialist sentiment is somewhat surprising for a state that escaped
colonial masters: "We have emancipated
our land, and the time has come to
emancipate our sea." 2 6
If Saudi Arabia was then aligned
against the major Western states and
with the developing ones, by the Third
Law of the Sea Conference it has found
that it is aligned with the vast majority
of states. The change, however, is not
due to a position shift by the Saudis; to
the contrary, they have remained consistent in advocating a 12-mile territorial
sea while an international consensus has
solidified around the figure. Saudi
Arabia, along with Arab League states,
has not objected to the demands of the
archipelagic states with regard to the
territorial sea, provided that lanes of
international navigation are kept open.
Saudi Arabia has also joined the majority of states in the present negotiations in advocating a 200-mile economic zone beyond the territorial
sea,27 but its commitment must be
viewed as more a matter of principle
than active concern when it is realized
that the Persian Gulf at a maximum is
160 miles in width and that the Red Sea
has a maximum width of 190 miles.
What is important for Saudi Arabia is
the more limited area of the contiguous
zone beyond the territorial sea, although, as will be mentioned later, the
country has seemingly endorsed the
merging of the contiguous and economic zone concepts. Currently, the
Kingdom is the only state in the Persian
Gulf that has explicitly claimed the
right of surveillance over an adjacent
6-mile zone in order to protect laws
concerned with navigation, security, finance, and sanitation.2 8

Saudi Arabia has been the leader in
the Gulf in establishing the 12-mile rule,
and it has also been one of the leaders in
advocating the universal adoption of the
rule. In the region, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait,
and Oman have followed the Saudi lead,
but Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates have yet to follow suit. It is
not likely that there will be any regional
disputes since, as Richard Young points
out, the 12-mile approach seems
destined to be the Persian Gulf norm.2 9
It is possible that there will be some
tension over the contiguous zone, but to
date this matter has not emerged as a
significant issue. What is significant is
that Saudi Arabia's consistent position
undoubtedly influenced the positions of
other littoral states in the Gulf and
contributed to the emergence of the
general consensus.
Offshore Boundary Disputes. As
early as 1949, the Saudis also showed
that they were capable of keeping pace
with new international law of the sea
developments. The Truman Proclamation of 1945 on the continental shelf
inspired the 1949 royal decree on the
submarine areas contiguous to Saudi
Arabia's Persian Gulf coasts. Despite the
fact that a continental shelf does not
exist in the geological sense in the Gulf,
the Saudi government, mindful of the
natural bounty below the waters off its
shores, wished to control its conservation and development in line with the
unilateral declarations of states that
could precisely lay claim to a continental shelf. The Kingdom claims that it
should exercise control over the submarine areas contiguous to its zone
because (1) the natural resources, in the
first place, are capable of being exploited by modern technology; (2) the
state can act in the interests of proper
usage and conservation of the resources;
(3) the resources can only be effectively
developed and conserved, at any rate,
with state involvement and help; (4)
activities off Saudi Arabia's coasts
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naturally involve its security; and (5)
"various other nations" have already
done SO.30
The Saudi decree echoes the Presidential proclamation, except in the important respect that jurisdiction and
control are asserted over the subsoil and
seabed itself, as Pakistan and Great
Britain have also asserted, and not
merely over the natural resources as in
the American document. In contrast to
the Kuwaiti constitutive reference to
the region's "becoming" a part of the
state, the Saudi wording like the American is declarative of an inherent right of
jurisdiction. 3 1 In addition, the Saudi
decree follows American and British
practice, and rejects Latin American
claims of extensive control, by asserting
that the waters above the contiguous
seabed and soil are not subject to
national interference. It should be
noted, parenthetically, that Saudi
Arabia has relied, in the absence of a
proper shelf, on the idea of contiguity.
This concept, however, is equivalent to
the idea of the submerged mass next to
a state's shores, and it should not be
confused with the contiguous zone itself
over which activities are regulated. Although relying on contiguity, Saudi
Arabia has not defined its extent.
Rather, like the American proclamation
on the continental shelf, the Saudi
decree provides for negotiations with
neighboring states in accordance with
"equitable principles" in order to determine the precise boundaries of the
contiguous "shelf."
The call to negotiation was taken up
in 1958 when an agreement was reached
between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on
the delimitation of the "underwater
areas belonging to both countries." It
might be noted that the actual delimitation between the two states is dependent not on "equitable principles"
per se, but on principles agreed upon by
the participant governments. Vice President Kuretsky of the International
Court of Justice in the North Sea

Continental Shelf Case pointed out that
Saudi Arabia allowed for this qualification in the 1949 proclamation, yet there
is resort to a standard concept in the
Bahraini-Saudi case. 32 The first clause
of the bilateral agreement indicates that
the division is to be based on the
median line, a principle of equidistance
that at least one student of Islamic law,
Muhammad Hamidullah, finds enshrined
in the classical sources as a valid means
of settling boundaries.33 It is also a
principle incorporated in Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement
deviates from strictly equal sharing in
the second clause in which a special area
is set aside for Saudi oil exploitation "in
accordance with the wish of H.H. the
Ruler of Bahrain." This grant may well
reflect an appreciation by the Bahraini
government of greater Saudi experience
in the oilfield, since Bahrain is to receive
half of the revenues from the area. Yet
Saudi administrative control and sovereignty are specifically emphasized-an
indicator, perhaps, that fraternal Islamic
relations are not always stronger than
national interests. The agreement is
notable as the first Persian Gulf effort
to settle conflicting claims over the
subsurface of what is termed the "regional waters."
A second, more important effort to
resolve Gulf differences is the SaudiIranian agreement of 1968 in which the
disputed islands of al-' Arabiyya and
FarsI were apportioned to Saudi Arabia
and Iran respectively. Consistent with
both states' practice since 1958, each
island is given a 12-mile territorial sea.
The principle of equidistance was employed to demarcate the boundary
between the overlapping territorial seas
of the islands, and the agreement also
delineated the boundaries of the submarine areas appertaining to both countries
in which ~ach has sovereign rights over
the seabed and subsoil.34 Without going
into great detail, we may say that the
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agreement as a whole has gone far
towards eliminating tension in the strategic waterway between its two most
important littoral states.
Another Gulf dispute remains largely
unresolved, though its conflict potential
is slight. It involves the status of the
Neutral Zone lying between Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait that was delimited in
the Uqair Convention of 1922. Although the agreement is silent on the
extent and position of maritime boundaries and though no bilateral arrangements existed until 1965, it is clear that
Saudi Arabia has for all practical purposes held that at least a portion of the
sea off the Neutral Zone belongs to it.
However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
agreed, on 7 July 1965, to demarcate
the overlapping jurisdictions off the
Neutral Zone. The crucial Article VII,
whose language itself is curious and
reflective of the divergent regimes of the
sea, provides that the two countries
have the same rights over those portions
of the territorial sea adjoining their
sectors of the Neutral Zone and that a
precise boundary is to be determined at
a later time. 3S The major, still unresolved, obstacle to agreement is due to
the fact that Saudi Arabia has decreed a
12-mile territorial sea whereas Kuwait
has chosen to leave the breadth of its
sea unspecified.
There is a compromise agreement in
the second paragraph of Article VII
which refers to a 6-mile zone for the
purpose of natural resource exploitation. Its specific reference is to the
seabed and subsoil next to the zone
which is to be annexed to the land
portion of the zone. Two points are
notable: (1) The article makes a clear
distinction between the waters and resources of the zone-the limits of the
former are unspecified whereas those of
the latter are indicated. This distinction
is a clear deviation from the Saudi
position -in the 1949 and 1958 territorial waters decrees and is thus an
indicator of both the special position of

the zone and the differences outstanding with Kuwait. (2) The article
makes a distinction between territorial
waters over which each country can
exercise rights consistent with its portion of the zone and an undivided
natural resource area that is attached to
the zone as a whole. Once again, the
extraordinary status of the zone is seen
with its ambiguous if not confused
division of rights alternately on a national and joint basis.
The 1965 agreement, differing from
the regular Saudi decrees which are
declarative of existing rights, is clearly
constitutive of a new maritime regime
off the Neutral Zone. The difference is
understandable given the unsettled
character of this zone. Indeed, the case
represents an extraordinary concession
by Saudi Arabia that its sovereignty is
limited; the bitter pill, however, is made
sweeter by the fact that Kuwait's sovereignty is also restricted, despite the
energetic denials of that country's legal
adviser. 36 To date, the boundary between the territorial seas has not been
settled nor has the ancillary dispute
concerning sovereignty over Qaru and
Umm al-Maradim Islands been resolved.
One somewhat related development
should be noted. In a 1968 royal decree,
the Saudi government asserted its claim
to the hydrocarbon resources of the
Red Sea. The pronouncement is odd in
that it applies to a zone which lies
adjacent to the continental shelf; it is
not clear what the zone exactly entails. 37 There is no precedent in terms
of a similar claim in the Persian Gulf,
nor, it should be noted, can the proposed area in the Red Sea be clearly
delimited until the continental shelf
itself of that sea is delineated, or even
claimed. Arguing negatively, we may
conclude that the zone was not meant
to be identified with the contiguous
zone since the decree does not assert
control over security, immigration, and
sanitation matters there; furthermore,
the idea of the proposed zone cannot be
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equated with either the "hovering,"
customs zone or pollution control zone
concepts since the decree does not
mention the governable activities subsumed under those categories. 38 The
primary Saudi concern in the 1968
decree is ownership and exclusive exploitation of the natural resources of
the seabed, and in this regard, the new,
evolving economic zone may be relevant.
This concept, it would be well to
note, has been controversial even within
the bloc of developing states, the Group
of 77.39 Disagreement has centered on
the extent of the zone, but there has
been broad agreement on the character
of the zone. For example, two declarations of the Organization of African
Unity and two endorsements by the
League of Arab States, both in 1973
and 1974, assert that coastal states have
sovereign rights over the mineral as well
as biological resources of this zone. The
Egyptian delegate to the Third Law of
the Sea Conference concluded in 1974
from these declarations that the continental shelf is included in this new
category,40 and in this sense perhaps
Saudi Arabia, by its 1968 decree, helped
to advance the thought that it is permissible to claim resources in the continental shelf and the seabed beyond. The
claim is still curious since the Saudi
Kingdom has not clarified its understanding of the economic concept other
than to join with other Arab states,
Iran, Honduras, Mexico, India, and
Liberia to suggest, in effect, that the
contiguous and economic zones are
largely synonymous. 41
Until there is further clarification,
the decree may be considered, in the
manner of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,42 as
dealing with continental shelf-type
matters. While there is no clause allowing for negotiation on the basis of
equitable principles in case of dispute
with neighboring states, there is a suggestion that joint exploration and

exploitation of the resources are possible in a "common zone" when recognized by the Saudi government. The
assumption that common zones are
determined by negotiation is reasonable.
No disputes appear likely since no major
exploitation of valuable resources is
underway, but it is a measure of Saudi
Arabia's interest in the potential oil,
heavy metal, and gypsum resources of
the sea that it has made its claim known
in advance of possible trouble.
Passage Through Straits. Having tentatively recognized the right of innocent
passage as early as the fishing regulations of 1932, Saudi Arabia strongly
objected to the particular right of
passage through straits as described in
Article 16 (4) of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
The article reads: "There shall be no
suspension of the innocent passage of
foreign ships through straits which are
used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas of the
territorial sea of a foreign State.,,43 The
basic Saudi position, as developed at the
United Nations conferences on the law
of the sea, is that innocent passage is a
right of way that is fully subject to law.
That is, the Kingdom argued that an
aggressor has no right of way in law
generally at the expense of his victims,
and that those states deemed in violation of international law and the United
Nations Charter have no right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
of states they have injured. In short,
aggression suspends the right of innocent passage. 44 It is clear that Israel is
considered the case in point.
In the course of specific deliberations, Saudi Arabia wished to amend the
American draft definition of innocent
passage with the proviso that passage is
not innocent when contrary "to the
present rules or to other rules of international law." The Saudi delegate,
al-Shuqayn, also wondered why another
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proposal, which was eventually adopted
by close vote, deleted the International
Law Commission's condition that states
are to respect the right of innocent
passage through straits normally used
for international traffic and why it
extended the range to straits connecting
the high seas to a territorial sea. When
Article 16 as a whole was adopted by a
wide margin in a 1958 plenary session,
Saudi Arabia abstained because it believed that subparagraph 4 is designed to
satisfy a unique case and is a "mutilation" of international law. Al-Shuqayn
ominously concluded: "Saudi Arabia
would take the necessary steps to protect its national interests against the
interpretation and application of paragraph 4.,,45
For the most part, Saudi Arabia
relied on the philosophical position that
the maritime laws of war are different,
and it even went so far as to propose a
subtitle indicating that the Convention
on the Territorial Sea applies only in
peacetime. Once again, its defense was
based predominantly on western sources
that have distinguished between the two
states of war and peace: the Corfu
Channel Case, the 1926 draft convention of the International Law Association, and the law of the sea draft treaty
of the International Law Commission.46 The Saudis, in effect, advanced
the position of the realists in the study
of international politics and law that,
since the persistent reality of conflict is
obvious, it would behoove the international community to develop specific
regulations to handle and to limit
violence rather than to try vainly to
abolish it.
Despite the rationale, Saudi Arabia's
opposition to innocent passage through
straits is clearly designed to cover Israeli
access to the strategic Straits of Tiran.
This opposition, it should be noted,
does not relate to the Strait of Hormuz,
since the interconnected waters there
are parts of the high seas through which
unimpeded innocent passage is con-

sidered unquestionable. Al-Shuqayn was
explicit at least once in his reference to
the Straits of Tiran, when he argued
that under the Palestine Armistice
Agreements, Israel was given no juridical
standing in the Gulf of 'Aqaba which is
under Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian
sovereignty.47 Saudi Arabia was united
with all the Arab states, save one, in
arguing the line and in accordingly
refusing to sign the Convention on the
Territorial Sea, and even with Tunisia
that did sign but expressly declined to
be bound by Article 16 (4).
In the Third Law of the Sea Conference, Saudi Arabia affirmed its position
that there is a right of innocent passage
through straits that connect parts of the
high seas only. In espousing that end, it
joined Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates in proposing a
definition of "straits used for international navigation" whereby the high seas
connection and customary usage of the
straits for international navigation become central. In 1974, Kuwait, speaking
on behalf of Saudi Arabia and others,
complained that the Convention article
on straits had been politically inspired. 48 It is in light of this complaint
and in view of Saudi Arabia's strong
antagonism towards the state of Israel
that one should question the earlier
assertion that the Kingdom was acting
only on behalf of general principle and
not "regional policies or transient situations,,49 when opposing Article 16 (4).
Closely connected to this position is
the Saudi concern over automatic
passage for warships through the world's
straits. In the 1958 Conference, Saudi
Arabia opposed the British proposal
which would allow unhindered access
for warships on the ground that there
are different types of straits. The "territorial straits" are inseparable from territorial waters, the Kingdom's delegate
argued, and consequently the coastal
state possesses the authority to regulate
passage of warships for its own security.
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Al-Shuqayn invoked such authorities as
Oppenheim and Colombos to buttress
the identification of straits and territorial waters, but Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
of the United Kingdom, himself a noted
legal authority, found the references
irrelevant since the question of territoriality is conceded by the very nature
of innocent passage. Undaunted,
al-Shuqayn turned to another great legal
authority and judge of the International
Court of Justice, Philip Jessup, for
support of the contention that warships
can no more sail through a state's
territorial waters without permission
than can a foreign army march across its
soil.s 0
When a draft provision requiring
prior authorization for the passage of
warships through the territorial sea as a
whole was deleted, Saudi Arabia voted
against the entire article along with 23
other states, thereby depriving the
article of the needed two-thirds majority for adoption. Al-Shuqayn said in
explanation that responsible sovereignty
demands prior authorization before a
warship can pass through territorial
waters, since warships may not be regarded as inherently peaceful; unauthorized passage, therefore, is a violation of sovereignty and equivalent to
aggression. S1 This emphasis on sovereign control contrasts somewhat with
that of the 1933 Coast Guard regulations which prohibit the levying of taxes
and the boarding by marine patrols of
foreign warships in its jurisdiction. The
only specific article on warships
adopted by the 1958 Geneva Conference, Article 23, is acceptable to Saudi
Arabia since it emphasizes that they are
subject to the coastal state's rules of
passage through its waters. The Convention, nevertheless, is objectionable because the gist of draft Article 24 (1)
allowing unauthorized warship passage
through straits is embodied in Article 16
which applies to "all ships" and which
absolutizes the right of unimpeded innocent passage through straits. As late

as 1974, the Democratic Republic of
Yemen voiced similar opposition to
treating warships and merchant vessels
in the same manner, especially when
passage through straits is concerned. S 2
This stance, it should be noted, is not
limited to Arab states or to Middle
Eastern straits; Canada recently has endorsed the principle of prior authorization, and Indonesia and Malaysia
actually require such notification and
authorization before transit is allowed
through straits they control. S3 The
United States, however, does not
officially recognize the necessity of such
notification.
Fishing. Saudi Arabia is less concerned with fishing than with other
maritime issues, but it has objected to
the Convention of the Living Resources
of the High Seas which does not consider fishing rights in the territorial sea.
The country strongly argued in the
1960 Geneva Conference that the
coastal state possesses sovereignty over
the fish in its waters and so must grant
authorization before foreign fishermen
can operate within its limits. The Saudi
delegate criticized particulary the British and French for claiming that such a
rule would create an economic hardship
for the maritime states that depend on
farflung fishing catches. His response
was a general accusation of neoimperialism, but it reflected Saudi sensitivity to fishing by outsiders in the
abundant waters of the Red Sea and
Persian Gulf: "You catch my fish from
coasts, you transport it in your fleets,
you can it in your factories, you carry it
again in your fleets to be exported to
my country, and the only thing I have
to do is to pay the bill-and how heavy
the bill is. ,,5 4
The representative's solution, however, was conciliatory because he suggested a sharing within or outside the
U.N. framework of the advanced technology of the great maritime states and
the fishing catch of the coastal states.
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Although Saudi Arabia has not asserted
its right to control fishing in a wider
area, it should be noted that when it
claimed a contiguous zone in the Persian
Gulf, it specifically stated that the
existence of the zone is not to be
construed as affecting Saudi fishing
rights. The disclaimer, intended to avoid
the conclusion that such rights are
limited to the zone, is compatible in
theory with one of the main components of the economic zone concept.
Given the strident voices that are often
heard in advancing the new economic
zone, the Saudi offer of cooperation
with regard to fishing exploitation is at
least refreshing.
Conclusions. Although it is difficult
to make concrete conclusions, some
general points can be stressed.
(1) Saudi Arabia accepts several
principles that are part of the developing regime of the sea, even though it
has not become a party to any of the
legal conventions. There are several
reasons why it has not signed the
Geneva conventions. First, Saudi Arabia
holds that maritime law is not part of
international law until it is whole. The
law of the sea is not likely to be
complete until it incorporates a definition of the breadth of the territorial sea,
a division of rules on innocent passage
according to states of war and peace,
and a clear statement of control over
the fish of the territorial sea. Secondly,
the Convention on the Territorial Sea
incorporates the objectionable rule that
all straits are open without limit to the
passage of all ships, thus precariously
ignoring the specific character of the
straits, the types of the ships involved,
and the disposition and intent of the
state whose vessel is transiting. Finally,
as one Saudi lawyer pointed out, the
reluctance to sign may be a function of
the traditional Saudi caution induced by
historical isolationism. 5 5
Despite Saudi Arabia's nonadherence
to the conventions, it has accepted

several principles that are part of the
emerging international consensus: sovereignty over a 12-mile territorial sea,
control of certain activities in the contiguous zone, sovereignty over the adjacent submarine area or continental
shelf and its natural resources, reliance
on the median.line and equidistance to
delineate offshore boundaries, the openness of the high seas beyond the territorial sea and continental shelf and the
basic right of innocent passage. In the
most recent negotiations in the Third
Law of the Sea Conference, it has also
indicated its support of the economic
zone concept and of the idea that ocean
bed resources are the "common heritage
of mankind," both of which are now
part of the new growing consensus.
There has not yet been a clear Saudi
position on the character of the
proposed international seabed authority
other than the bland statement that it
should respect the rights of all states
and be fair in distribution. 5 6 The general point is clear, however, that Saudi
Arabia in practice accepts many of the
maritime standards which are found in
legal texts it chooses not to endorse.
(2) The Saudi position is not seriously at odds with the Western position
generally and the American position
particularly. Part of the reason for the
coincidence of views is the fact that in
the absence of Islamic guidance, Saudi
Arabia has relied heavily on predominantly occidental treaties, diplomatic notes, court cases, and scholars to
elucidate the legal norms. While it is
true that the Saudis may have differed
with the United States and Great Britain
frequently in the past, it is also true that
by the time of the present negotiations,
they were largely in accord with those
states and differing with many of the
developing ones. It is interesting to note
that in the one area, passage through
straits, where Saudi Arabia and the West
disagree strongly, the Kingdom's position may partly be influenced by its
adamant belief that Israel's most
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grievous sin has been to occupy the holy
city of Jerusalem. In general, however,
we may conclude that culture has not
affected Saudi Arabia's maritime policy
and that it has acted, like any modern
state, to advance its national interests
and to legitimize them by invocation of
the standard sources of modern interna·
tionallaw.
(3) Saudi Arabia's behavior is bifurcated. On its western shores, it has acted
to support the claim that Israel has no
legitimate right of transit to Eilat. This
stance is mitigated by the fact that the
navigable channel through the Straits of
Tiran lies in Egyptian, not Saudi,
waters, but Saudi Arabia's growing
might, its clear antipathy for Israel, and
its strong support of Egypt suggest that
the legal position cannot be discounted
as contributing to the general tension.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has
indicated a willingness to cooperate and
negotiate in matters concerning the Persian Gulf. Evidence can be found in the
agreements with Bahrain, Iran, and
Kuwait. The Kingdom, moreover, has
committed itself in principle to the
equitable distribution and exploitation
of sea resources off both shores. The
attitude of compromise at sea is heartening at a time when resources on land
are being depleted rapidly.
Saudi Arabia may not be in the
leadership of the developing states nor is
it a substantial naval power, but it is a
state with significant resources at its

disposal. Its wealth is the main underpinning of its foreign policy which has
generally sought to preserve the status
quo rather than to foster systemic transformations. 57 Caution and pragmatism,
indeed, mark the Saudi approach to
international politics and international
law. Political caution has recently been
confirmed by its firm opposition to the
Soviet naval base in Somalia58 and
pragmatism by its continuing efforts to
avoid direct military struggle with Israel.
Legal caution is evidenced by its hesitation in becoming a party to specific
multilateral covenants and pragmatism
by its factual compliance with the law
nonetheless. Since the "wide common"
of Mahan59 is troubled in these days of
exorbitant national claims and naval
rivalries, it is important to note that
neither Saudi Arabia's aloofness from
the conventions nor its generally strong
commitment to Islam has made it unsympathetic to the West. But Saudi
Arabia's maritime policy is really two
tales of the sea. In one case the antagonism towards Israel has determined the
Saudi resolve to oppose part of the law,
but in several other cases the perception
of state interests has led both to the
moderate assertion of control over
nearby maritime zones and to the willingness to negotiate conflicting claims in
accordance with the broad legal framework most states accept:- The Saudi
example in the Persian Gulf at least is
reassuring, and it is hoped that this
example will be influential.
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